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California's Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiff's
Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits
The collateral source rule ("Rule") provides that a tortfeasor cannot
reduce an adverse judgment by the amount of collateral benefits received
by the plaintiff.1 The Rule results in compensating the plaintiff twice for
the same injuries, once from the tortfeasor and once from the collateral
2
source. Commentators almost uniformly have criticized the Rule, primarily asserting that the Rule conflicts with the compensatory function3
of tort law and, consequently, contributes to increased insurance costs.
Despite its controversial nature, the Rule has been a part of the American law of damages since 18544 and now is applied in one form or another in every state of the union.5 There are, however, many exceptions
to the Rule.6 As a consequence of its many applications and exceptions,
1. See infra notes 25-26 & accompanying text.
2. Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 7, 465 P.2d 61, 63-64, 84
Cal. Rptr. 173, 175-76 (1970). For criticism of the Rule, see Fleming, The CollateralSource
Rule and Loss Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1478, 1478-85 (1966); James, Social
Insurance and Tort Liability: The Problem of Alternative Remedies, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 537,
537-63 (1952); Maxwell, The CollateralSource Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46
MINN. L. REV. 669 (1962); Peckinpaugh, An Analysis of the CollateralSource Rule, 32 INS.
COUNS. J. 32 (1965); Schwartz, The CollateralSource Rule, 41 B.U.L. REv. 348, 349-54
(1961); Tait, Connecticut'sCollateralSource Rule: Stepchild of the Law of Damages, 1 CONN.
L. REV. 93, 93-95 (1968); West, The CollateralSource Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's
Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. REv. 395, 395-97 (1963); Note, Unreasonin the Law of Damages: The
CollateralSource Rule, 77 HARV. L. REv. 741 (1964); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the MedicalMalpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417, 1447-50. For support
of the Rule, see Moceri & Messina, The CollateralSource Rule in PersonalInjury Litigation, 7
GONZ. L. REv. 310 (1972).
3. Tort law seeks mainly to compensate the victim for his injuries. W. KEETON, D.
DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER AND KEETON]. Application of the Rule results in double
recovery for plaintiff: once from his collateral source and once from the tortfeasor. In addition, because the plaintiff's collateral source is often an insurance company and defendant's
judgment is paid by his insurance company, the insurance industry pays for the plaintiff's
double recovery. This expense is then passed on to the consumer in the form of higher premiums. See infra notes 27-39 & accompanying text.
4. See The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 152 (1854); Maxwell,
supra note 2, at 671 n.6; Note, supra note 2, at 741.
5. See Peckinpaugh, supra note 2, at 32; Note, supra note 2, at 742. These authors
assert that Alabama does not apply the Rule. The Alabama courts recently have changed their
approach, however, and now apply the Rule to all situations unless a statute provides otherwise. See, e.g., Gribble v. Cox, 349 So. 2d 1141 (Ala. 1977); Fleming, supra note 2, at 1480-84,
1516-23, 1535-40.
6. For example, exceptions to the Rule have been made in medical malpractice actions,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1986), products liability actions, ALA. CODE § 6-5-520[667]
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the Rule has spawned a tremendous amount of litigation.
In California, one evolving exception to the Rule involves plaintiffs'
receipt of uninsured motorist benefits under California Insurance Code
section 11580.2.8 After the plaintiff has received uninsured motorist benefits under his insurance policy, the exception prohibits the plaintiff from
recovering the amount of those collateral benefits in a subsequent suit
against the tortfeasor. 9
In 1970, the California Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to the
Rule in He/fend v. Southern CaliforniaRapid Transit District,10 but expressly declined to address "the appropriateness of the rule's application
in the myriad of possible situations which we have not discussed or
which are not presented by the facts of this case." 11 With that door
open, in 1980 a California court of appeal in Waite v. Godfrey 12 held that
the Rule did not apply to uninsured motorist benefits received pursuant
to California Insurance Code section 11580.2.13 In 1985, however, in
Van Dyne v. McCarty1 4 another California court of appeal applied the
Rule in a similar fact situation. As a result of these conflicting decisions,
the Rule's applicability in California to uninsured motorist benefits is unclear. The California Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear Van
Dyne on appeal.15 Consequently, Van Dyne provides the California
Supreme Court with an opportunity to resolve the conflict in the courts
of appeal.
The plight of the innocent victims of traffic accidents caused by uninsured motorists has been a serious social problem in California. 16 The
California legislature has amended the state's uninsured motorist statute
repeatedly to ensure a just recovery for the injured party.1 7 Because un-

25 (Supp. 1985), actions in which the defendant himself is the source of the collateral benefits,
Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961), and in any actions that
would result in double liability to the defendant, Thomas v. Shelton, 740 F.2d 478 (7th Cir.
1984). See infra notes 83-100 & accompanying text.
7. Note, supra note 2, at 741.
8. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1986). This section requires that all domestic
automobile insurance policies provide minimal coverage for damage caused by the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle unless the policy holder expressly refused such coverage in writing.
9. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980).
10. 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
11. Id. at 6 n.3, 465 P.2d at 63 n.3, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175 n.3.
12. 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980).
13. Id. at 775, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 891.
14. 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 822, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571, 574-75 (1985), hearing granted, S.F.
No. 24830 (Cal. May 23, 1985).
15. Van Dyne v. McCarty, S.F. No. 24830 (Cal. May 23, 1985).
16.

Comment, Uninsured Motorist Insurance: California'sLatest Answer to the Problem

of the FinanciallyIrresponsibleMotorist, 48 CALIF. L. REV.516, 516 (1960). In 1959, approximately 12% of all licensed drivers were uninsured, a total of 840,000 drivers. Id.
17. The uninsured motorist statute has been amended 18 times. For a complete legisla-
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certainty over the Rule's application may lead to under- or over- compensating the injured party, determining whether the Rule is applicable to
uninsured motorist benefits is essential to the establishment of a comprehensive scheme for providing a just recovery to the injured party.
This Note examines the Rule and its applicability to uninsured motorist benefits in California. The Note begins with a discussion of the
Rule, its flaws, and the justifications for its continued existence.18 The
Note then examines the important California cases that apply the Rule 19
and analyzes the cases that recognize exceptions to the Rule.20 After
discussing the nature, function, and purpose of the California uninsured
motorist statute, 2 1 the Note analyzes the two California appellate court
cases that reach conflicting results in their applications of the Rule to
uninsured motorist benefits. 22 Finally, the Note concludes that the Rule
should be applied uniformly to uninsured motorist benefits, except when
the plaintiff's insurer
has brought a previous action against the unin23
sured motorist.
The Collateral Source Rule
Although the collateral source rule serves both as a rule of damages
and a rule of evidence, 24 this Note is concerned primarily with its role as
a rule of damages. With regard to damages, the Rule provides that
"[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured party from
other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor's liability, although
they cover all or part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable. '2 5 In
other words, a judgment against the defendant is not reduced by the
amount of benefits received by the plaintiff from a collateral source.
tive history of the statute, see P. EISLER & J.MOLINELLI, CALIFORNIA UNINSURED MOTORiST LAW § 1.7 (3d ed. 1979).
18. See infra notes 24-44 & accompanying text.

19.
20.
21.
22.

See
See
See
See

infra notes
infra notes
infra notes
infra notes

48-81 & accompanying text.
83-97 & accompanying text.
101-13 & accompanying text.
114-45 & accompanying text.

23.

See infra notes 146-219 & accompanying text.

24. Moceri & Messina, supra note 2, at 310. As a rule ofevidence, the Rule provides that
"evidence of the plaintiff being compensated by a collateral source for all or a portion of the
damages caused by the defendant's wrongful act is generally inadmissible." 22 AM. JUR. 2D

Damages § 330 (1965); see Baroni v. Rosenberg, 209 Cal. 4, 6, 284 P. 1111, 1113 (1930). As a
rule of damages, the Rule provides that the amount of damages recovered from a collateral
source will not be set off from the judgment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2)
(1979). The Rule serves similar functions as a rule of damages and of evidence because it
generally is believed that the jury will not take into account what it has not heard in evidence.
The rationale is that if a jury hears evidence of collateral benefits, it will deduct these from the
damage calculations. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1986). Section 3333.1
provides for the abrogation of the Rule as a rule of evidence in medical malpractice cases,
which practically results in abrogating the Rule as a rule of damages. Id.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920(2) (1979).
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To illustrate how the Rule operates, assume that motorist A's automobile is hit by motorist B's automobile. As a result, A suffers personal
injuries and seeks medical care. A's insurance company reimburses A in
the sum of $10,000 for the medical expenses incurred as a result of the
accident. A then sues B for negligence and the jury returns a verdict for
A in the amount of $20,000. According to the Rule, B is liable for the
entire amount of the judgment; the Rule precludes the reduction of the
judgment against B by the $10,000 paid to A by A's insurance company.
Thus, A recovers twice for the same injuries, once from his insurance
26
company and once from B, the defendant.
The Rule has been criticized because it conflicts with at least two
basic principles of American tort law. 27 First, the Rule conflicts with the
compensatory function of tort law. 28 In a negligence action, tort law
seeks to compensate the plaintiff, that is, to put him in the place he occupied before the tort occurred. 29 The Rule, on the other hand, requires
that the defendant pay the judgment against him even though the plaintiff already has been compensated for the injuries suffered as a result of
defendant's negligent conduct. The California Supreme Court has characterized this double recovery as punitive in nature. 30 Punitive damages
have no role in compensating the injured party. The sole purpose of pu31
nitive damages is to deter future tortious conduct by the defendant.
Second, because a benefit is conferred upon the plaintiff as a result of
the tortfeasor's conduct and is not deducted from the plaintiff's judgment, the Rule is in conflict with the damage mitigation principle enunciated in the second Restatement of Torts.32 That principle states:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the
plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that was harmed, the value of the
benefit conferred is considered
in mitigation of damages, to the extent
33
that this is equitable.
For example, if a surgeon performs an unprivileged operation resulting in
pain and suffering, it may be shown that the operation averted future
suffering. 34 Any recovery for the present pain and suffering should be
26. See Fleming, supra note 2, at 1478; Note, supra note 2, at 741.
27. West, supra note 2, at 395.
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901(A) (1979). This Note addresses the Rule
only as it applies to automobile accidents. In this context, compensation of the injured party is
the primary function of tort law.
29. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, § 2.
30. City of Salinas v. Souza & McCue Constr. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 217, 228, 424 P.2d 921,
926-27, 57 Cal. Rptr. 337, 342-43 (1967); see also 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 25.22 (1956); Fleming, supra note 2, at 1484.
31.

PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 3, § 2.

32.
33.
34.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1979).
Id.; see also Maxwell, supra note 2, at 669-70; West, supra note 2, at 395.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 comment a (1979).
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reduced by the value of the special benefit, avoidance of future suffering.
The Rule, however, contravenes the principle of mitigation of damages
because the special benefit, receipt of benefits from a collateral source,
does not act to mitigate damages.
In addition to conflicting with basic tort principles, the Rule has
been criticized on the basis that it has outlived its usefulness. Critics
point out that when the Rule was first applied, the total amount of benefits received from collateral sources was small. 35 Therefore, the Rule
may have served a useful function in ensuring full compensation to the
injured party.36 Today, however, the overwhelming percentage of com37
pensation to tort victims comes from sources other than the tortfeasor.
Studies have shown that two-thirds of tort victims' total recovery comes
from collateral sources. 38 Consequently, the Rule goes beyond ensuring
full compensation for the plaintiff. Additionally, because insurance companies usually pay the judgment against a tortfeasor, this double recovery
leads to an unnecessary increase in insurance costs to the public in ex39
change for an unnecessary windfall to plaintiffs.
Despite these criticisms, the Rule, with such widespread acceptance,4° is not without justification. Two rationales exist for the Rule.
First, when there must be a choice between a windfall to the plaintiff or a
windfall to the defendant, the party who is less culpable, the plaintiff,
should prevail. The Tenth Circuit aptly stated this rationale for the Rule
in Grayson v. Williams:41
35. Fleming, supra note 2, at 1478-80; Schwartz, supra note 2, at 348. These collateral
benefits come from a variety of sources including the victim's own insurance, social security,
workers' compensation, and unemployment insurance.
36. Fleming, supra note 2, at 1480-85.
37. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND 115
(1975). A 1964 study found that only 55% of a tort victim's compensation came from the
tortfeasor, while 38% came from the victim's own insurance, with the remaining 7% coming

from other sources, including social security, the victim's employer, and workers' compensation. A. CONRAD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATZ, C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE AccIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF INJURY REPARATION 147
(1964). One commentator has stated that the "[t]ort recovery has thus long ceased to be the

only, or even the principal, source of repairing accident losses, besides the private resources of
the victim himself." Fleming, supra note 2, at 1480.
38. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 115. According to these

authors, only 44 cents of every dollar of insurance premium actually reaches the tort victim
due to administrative and litigation costs. Out of this 44 cents, 8 cents goes toward injuries

already reimbursed by collateral sources and only 14.5 of the 44 cents goes to reimburse actual
loss that has not been compensated from some other source. Id. at 120.
39. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, supra note 37, at 114-15. Since the defendant

usually is represented in the negligence action by his insurance company, it is the insurance
industry that pays twice for the plaintiff's injuries. Consequently, some critics have argued
that the Rule leads to increased insurance costs for the public. Id.
40. See supra notes 4-5 & accompanying text.

41.

256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1958).
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Where a part of a wrongdoer's liability is discharged by payment
from a collateral source, as here, the question arises who shall benefit
therefrom, the wrongdoer or the injured person. No reason in law,
equity or good conscience can be advanced why a wrongdoer should
benefit from part payment from a collateral source of damages caused
by his wrongful act. If there must be a windfall certainly it is more just
that the injured person shall profit therefrom, rather than the wrong42
doer shall be relieved of his full responsibility for his wrongdoing.
The second rationale for the Rule is that it ensures that the plaintiff
will be fully compensated. Compensation through legal redress is not
always adequate:
Legal "compensation" for personal injuries does not actually
compensate. Not many people would sell an arm for the average or
even the maximum amount that juries award for loss of an arm. Moreover the injured person seldom gets the compensation 43he "recovers,"
for a substantial attorney's fee usually comes out of it.
The Rule helps to remedy these problems inherent in compensating the
tort victim.
In short, in justifying their adherence to the Rule, courts have balanced the conflicting principles of tort law relating to the Rule in favor of
the injured party. 44
The applicability of the Rule to a particular situation is determined
on a case by case basis. 45 Generally, the source of the collateral benefits
controls whether the Rule is applied in a particular situation.4 6 Certain
sources of collateral benefits make the argument for application of the
Rule more compelling. The following section of the Note discusses the
applicability of the Rule to cases involving three different sources of collateral benefits and the policy reasons underlying that determination.
Application of the Collateral Source Rule
As stated above, application of the Rule often depends upon the
source of the collateral benefits, 47 which can be divided into three categories: payments from the plaintiff's automobile, medical, or life insurance
company; plaintiff's workers' compensation coverage provided through
42. Id. at 65.
43. Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1954); see also Helfend v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 12-13, 465 P.2d 61, 68-69, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 180-81
(1970) (The Rule ensures that the plaintiff is more fully compensated because of the nonrecovery of attorney's fees under the American law of damages.).
44. 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 206 (1965).
45. See Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d 353, 392 N.E.2d 1 (1979).
The Peterson court "refuse[d] to join those courts which, without consideration of the facts of
each case, blindly adhere to 'the Rule, permitting the plaintiff to exceed compensatory limits in
the interest of insuring an impact upon the defendant.'" Id. at 363, 392 N.E.2d at 5 (quoting
Note, supra note 2, at 741-42).
46. See infra notes 48-82 & accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 48-82 & accompanying text.
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his employer; and a third party who gratuitously conferred collateral
benefits upon the plaintiff, such as free medical care from a physician.
Benefits Provided by Plaintiff's Insurance Company
The California Supreme Court in Helfend v. Southern California
Rapid Transit District4 8 upheld the application of the collateral source
rule to insurance benefits for which plaintiff had paid the premiums.4 9 In
Helfend, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as the result of the negligent operation of a motor bus by defendant's employee.5 0 The plaintiff
incurred approximately $2700 in special damages, approximately $1300
of which represented medical expenses.5 1 Eighty percent of the plain52
tiff's medical expenses were paid by his personal medical insurance.
The California Supreme Court upheld the trial court's refusal to admit
evidence of the insurance payments.5 3 The Helfend court's holding was
based upon the important public policy of encouraging individuals to
purchase insurance:
The collateral source rule ...

embodies the venerable concept that a

person who has invested years of insurance premiums to assure his
medical care should receive the benefits of his thrift. The tortfeasor
should not garner the benefits of his victim's providence.
The collateral source rule expresses a policy judgment in favor of
encouraging citizens to purchase and maintain insurance for personal
injuries and for other eventualities. .

.

. If we were to permit a

tortfeasor to mitigate damages with payments from plaintiff's insurance, plaintiff would be in a position inferior to that of having bought
no insurance, because his payment of premiums would have earned no
benefit . . .54
48. 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970).
49. Id. at 15, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
50. Id. at 4-5, 465 P.2d at 62, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
51. Id. at 5 n.1, 465 P.2d at 62 n.1, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 174 n.1.
52. Id. at 5, 465 P.2d at 62, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
53. Id. at 15, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
54. Id. at 9-10, 465 P.2d at 66, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 178 (footnote omitted). The Helfend
court also stated that the increased use of reimbursement and subrogation clauses in insurance
policies also supports application of the Rule. Application of the Rule often will not result in a
double recovery to the plaintiff because the source of the collateral benefits may exercise his
right of subrogation and recover the benefits paid from the tort recovery. Id. at 10-11, 465
P.2d at 67, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 179. This reasoning, however, is weakened by the fact that subrogation is most often found in cases involving property insurance, except when otherwise provided by statute. See B. ANDERSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 134, at 78687 (3d ed. 1951); Fleming, supra note 2, at 1499. For an explanation of the limitations imposed on subrogation, see Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60
MICH. L. REV. 841 (1962). Subrogation principles as they relate to uninsured motorist benefits are discussed infra notes 108-13 & accompanying text.
The Helfend court also stated that the Rule plays an important role in the delicate calculation of general damages by the jury. Helfend, 2 Cal. 3d at 11-12, 465 P.2d at 67-68, 84 Cal.
Rptr. at 179-80. This justification, however, supports the Rule only as a rule of evidence. The
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The Helfend court's reasoning was not limited to plaintiff's insurance coverage. Rather, the court affirmed its adherence to the Rule in
tort cases in which the benefits derive from an independent "collateral
source-such as insurance, pension, continued wages, or disability payments-for which [the plaintiff] had actually or constructively paid
"55

In summary, in cases in which the plaintiff directly contributes to
the fund providing the collateral benefits, the Rule's application is supported by two public policy rationales: favoring the injured party over
the culpable tortfeasor 56 and encouraging the public to purchase insur57
ance benefits.
Workers' Compensation Benefits Provided by Plaintiff's Employer
In DeCruz v. Reid,58 the California Supreme Court held that the
Rule is applicable to workers' compensation benefits, at least when the
employer has waived its right of subrogation.5 9 In DeCruz, a worker died
in an accident involving the use of farm equipment as a result of the
defendant's negligence. 60 The plaintiffs, dependents of the deceased
worker, received $10,000 in workers' compensation benefits 6 I and the
employer released its statutory right of subrogation, which, upon a tort
recovery by plaintiffs, would have allowed the employer to recoup from
62
plaintiffs the workers' compensation benefits paid to plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs then filed a wrongful death action against the defendant. The
trial court applied the Rule, thereby allowing the plaintiffs a "double
'63
recovery."

The California Supreme Court affirmed, allowing the plaintiffs a
court also justified the Rule on the basis that it ensures that the plaintiff is fully compensated
because juries are not aware that the award will be reduced by the plaintiff's attorney's fees.
Id. at 12-13, 465 P.2d at 68-69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 180-81.
55. Helfend, 2 Cal. 3d at 13-14, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
56. See supra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
57. Helfend, 2 Cal. 3d at 9-10, 465 P.2d at 66, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 178.
58. 69 Cal. 2d 217, 444 P.2d 342, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1968).
59. Id. at 226-27, 444 P.2d at 348-49, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 556-57.
60. Id. at 220, 444 P.2d at 344, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
61. Id. at 221, 444 P.2d at 344, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 552.
62. Id. at 221, 444 P.2d at 344-45, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 552-53. The Workers' Compensation
Act, CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 3200-6208 (West 1971 & Supp. 1986), provides that an employer
who becomes obligated to pay compensation as a result of the negligence of a third party may
recover the amount so expended. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 69, 366 P.2d 641, 647-48, 17
Cal. Rptr. 369, 375-76 (1961). The employer can bring an action directly against the third
party, CAL. LAB. CODE § 3852 (West Supp. 1986), join as a party plaintiff in the employee's
action against the tortfeasor, or consolidate a separately brought action. Id. § 3853. The employer also can allow the employee to prosecute the action himself and subsequently apply for
a first lien against the amount of the employee's judgment, less an allowance for litigation
expenses and attorney's fees. Id. § 3856(b) (West 1971).
63. DeCruz, 69 Cal. 2d at 221, 444 P.2d at 345, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 553.
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double recovery because the employer waived its subrogation rights. 64
The DeCruz court distinguished one of its previous decisions that had
reasoned that the purpose of the employer's subrogation rights was to
prevent a double recovery for the plaintiff.65 The court stated that,
although "the waiver of subrogation rights by the employer... may
inure to the benefit of the injured employee[,] ... defendants cannot complain that the employer will not seek reimbursement from plaintiffs since
neither plaintiffs nor the employer has profited directly or indirectly by
any wrong attributable to either."' 66 In other words, the benefits should
inure to the innocent employee rather than to the culpable tortfeasor.
Unlike the situation involving payment of collateral benefits by
plaintiff's insurer, 67 the plaintiff/employee does not directly contribute
to the workers' compensation fund providing the benefits. Nevertheless,
the employee constructively pays for the benefits through his labor.6 8
Benefits are part of the employee's wages. Accordingly, workers' compensation benefits fall into the category of "actual or constructive" payment of benefits by the plaintiff and application of the Rule has been
69
justified on this basis.
The justification for applying the Rule to workers' compensation
benefits, however, is not as strong as it is for applying the Rule to personal insurance benefits. In the personal insurance context, the plaintiff
directly chooses to purchase insurance. Application of the Rule, therefore, encourages the purchase of insurance. In the workers' compensation context, however, the plaintiff/employee does not choose to
purchase the insurance; the employer is required by statute to provide
coverage. 70 Consequently, not all jurisdictions apply the Rule to work71
ers' compensation benefits.
64. Id. at 223-27, 444 P.2d at 346-49, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 554-57.
65. Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 73, 366 P.2d 641, 650, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369, 378 (1961),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 89-95.
66. DeCruz, 69 Cal. 2d at 227, 444 P.2d at 349, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 557.
67. See supra notes 48-57 & accompanying text.
68. See Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 6 n.5, 465 P.2d 61, 63
n.5, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 175 n.5 (1970).
69. Id. at 13-14, 465 P.2d at 69, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 181. It also has been argued that the
purpose of the workers' compensation awards are not compensatory but rehabilatory. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION PRACTICE §

1.3

(3d ed. 1985). Consequently, because the plaintiff would be receiving the benefits for a purpose
other than compensation, the operation of the Rule would not conflict with the compensatory

function of tort law.
70.

CAL. LAB. CODE

§ 3700 (West Supp. 1986). The employer may also be self-insured if

he provides sufficient proof of ability to administer and pay workers' compensation claims. Id.
§ 3700(b).
71. See, e.g., Kirkham v. Hickerson Bros. Truck Co., 29 Colo. App. 303, 485 P.2d 513
(1971) (The Rule does not apply when, after receipt of workers' compensation benefits, the
plaintiff sues the tortfeasor.); Schneider v. Farmers Merchant Inc., 106 Idaho 241, 678 P.2d 33
(1983) (The Rule does not apply when the employer and third-party tortfeasor arrived at a
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Gratuitous Payments by a Third Party
In Rodriguez v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,72 plaintiff was injured

while working on defendant's premises.7 3 As a result, plaintiff required
constant medical attention.7 4 Plaintiff tried to introduce the cost of medical care at trial as an element of damages,7 5 even though he had received
the medical attention gratuitously.7 6 The trial court denied defendant's
motion to show that plaintiff received the services gratuitously, and a
California court of appeal affirmed,7 7 reasoning:
In so far as [the receipt of] gratuities are concerned, the [Rule's
application] appears to be in keeping with the collateral source rule
rationale: "The fact that either under contract or gratuitously such
[medical] treatment has been paid for by another does not defeat the
cause of action of the injured party to
recover the reasonable value of
78
such treatment from the tortfeasor.
The court did not discuss the fact that plaintiff contributed nothing,
either "actually or constructively," to the fund providing the benefits.

The rationale for applying the Rule in gratuity cases is simply a decision
79
to benefit the injured party rather than the wrongdoer.

Because gratuity cases have only this one justification for applying
the Rule, courts are in conflict regarding whether the Rule should be

applied in these cases. A majority of jurisdictions apply the Rule despite
its single justification.80 There are, however, a growing number of jurisdictions that refuse to apply the Rule to gratuity cases. 8 1
settlement regarding their respective liabilities.); Tucker v. Union Oil Co., 100 Idaho 590, 603
P.2d 156 (1979) (The Rule does not apply when the employer is joined as a concurrently
negligent tortfeasor.); Castro v. Bass, 74 N.M. 254, 392 P.2d 668 (1964) (The Rule does not
apply when the plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits prior to his suit against the
tortfeasor.); Colarusso v. Mills, 99 R.I. 409, 208 A.2d 381 (1965) (The Rule does not apply
when plaintiff sues the tortfeasor after the receipt of workers' compensation benefits, if the
plaintiff did not reach an agreement with the employer regarding reimbursement.). A bill has
been introduced in Congress that would abolish the Rule with respect to workers' compensation benefits in products liability actions. See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1983).
72. 87 Cal. App. 3d 626, 151 Cal. Rptr. 399 (1978).
73. Id. at 639-42, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 405-06.
74. Id. at 661, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
75. Id. at 660-62, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 418-19.
76. Id. at 661, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 418.
77. Id. at 662, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 419.
78. Id. (quoting Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 637, 354 P.2d 1073, 1076, 7
Cal. Rptr. 377, 380 (1960)).
79. See supra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
80. Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 366, 371 (1977).
81. See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill.
2d 353, 392 N.E.2d 1
(1979). The Peterson court reasoned that
[i]n
a situation in which the injured party incurs no expense, obligation or liability,
we see no justification for applying the rule. We refuse to join those courts which,
without consideration of the facts of each case, blindly adhere to 'the collateral
source rule, permitting the plaintiff to exceed compensatory limits in the interest of
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Application of the Rule to particular collateral benefits, therefore,
ultimately depends upon the justification proffered. When the injured
party directly contributes to the fund that provides the benefits, the justification for the Rule is strongest. The next most compelling situation for
application of the Rule is when the injured party makes constructive contributions to the source of the collateral funds, as in the case of workers'
compensation. Finally, when the injured party has made no contribution
to a fund that provides the collateral benefits, the Rule is justified solely
by the policy favoring the less culpable party. The courts 82openly disagree
about the application of the Rule in the latter situation.
Exceptions to the Collateral Source Rule
The collateral source rule is a product of competing public policy
concerns. As stated above, in certain cases the public policy concerns
may weigh more heavily in favor of application of the Rule. The balancing of public policy concerns, however, may also result in the inapplicability of the Rule in certain situations. The California courts and the
legislature have established three exceptions to the Rule as a result of
these conflicting public policy concerns.
The Medical MalpracticeException Resulting from the High Cost of Insurance
Legislatures recently have provided an exception to the collateral
insuring an impact upon the defendant.'... The purpose of compensatory tort damages is to compensate... ; it is not the purpose of such damages to punish defendants
or bestow a windfall upon plaintiffs. The view that a windfall, if any is to be enjoyed,
should go to the plaintiff... borders too closely on approval of unwarranted punitive
damages ....
Id. at 363, 392 N.E.2d at 5 (citations omitted); see also Daniels v. Celeste, 303 Mass. 148, 21
N.E.2d 1 (1939); Baldwin v. Kansas City Ry., 218 S.W. 955 (Mo. Ct. App. 1920); Coyne v.
Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962); Drinkwater v. Dinsmore,
80 N.Y. 390 (1880). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 366 (1977); Annot., 128 A.L.R. 686
(1940). Although the California Supreme Court has not ruled directly on gratuitous payments
in this context, in Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84
Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970), the court in dicta seemed to embrace the growing minority rule when it
approved of a New York decision, Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y.2d 372, 183 N.E.2d 891, 230
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1962), that held the Rule inapplicable to purely gratuitous benefits. Helfend, 2
Cal. 3d at 6 n.5, 465 P.2d at 63 n.5, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175 n.5; see supra notes 48-57 & accompanying text. The Helfend court stated that the plaintiff
had neither paid premiums for the services under some form of insurance coverage
nor manifested any indication that he would endeavor to repay those who had given
him assistance.... On the other hand, New York has joined most states in holding
that a tortfeasor may not mitigate damages by showing that an injured plaintiff
would receive a disability pension ....
In these cases the plaintiff had actually or
constructively paid for the pension by having received lower wages or by having
contributed directly to the pension plan.
2 Cal. 3d at 6 n.5, 465 P.2d at 63 n.5, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 175 n.5. (citations omitted).
82. See supra notes 79-81 & accompanying text.
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source rule in cases involving defendants subject to dramatically increasing insurance costs, such as medical malpractice actions. During the
1970's, medical malpractice insurance premiums increased substantially,
causing the curtailment of service by health care providers.8 3 Because
the Rule generally leads to increased insurance costs, 84 the California
legislature sought partially to remedy this "medical malpractice crisis" 8 5
86
by abolishing the Rule in medical malpractice actions.
The legislature justified its action, which undermined the rationale
of the Rule favoring the less culpable party, 87 by stating that the medical
malpractice crisis warranted such action. 88 The legislature found that
83. Comment, supra note 2, at 1417.
84. See supra note 39 & accompanying text.
85. Comment, supra note 2, at 1417.
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (West Supp. 1986). The statute reads:
(a) In the event the defendant so elects, in an action for personal injury against a
health care provider based upon professional negligence, he may introduce evidence
of any amount payable as a benefit to the plaintiff as a result of the personal injury
pursuant to the United States Social Security Act, any state or federal income disability or workers' compensation act, any health, sickness or income-disability coverage,
accident insurance that provides health benefits or income-disability coverage, and
any contract or agreement of any group organization, partnership, or corporation to
provide, pay for, or reimburse the cost of medical, hospital, dental, or other health
care services. Where the defendant elects to introduce such evidence, the plaintiff
may introduce evidence of any amount which the plaintiff has paid or contributed to
secure his right to any insurance benefits concerning which the defendant has introduced evidence.
(b) No source of collateral benefits introduced pursuant to subdivision (a) shall recover any amount against the plaintiff nor shall it be subrogated to the rights of the
plaintiff against a defendant.
Id.
Fourteen other states have passed statutes eliminating or modifying the operation of the

Rule in medical malpractice actions. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55-548 (1984); ARIZ.
ANN. § 12-565 (Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6862 (Supp. 1984); FLA.

REV. STAT.
STAT. ANN.

§ 768.50 (West Supp. 1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1205 (Smith-Hurd 1983) (50%
reduction); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.136 (West 1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819 (1984);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-C:7(I) (Supp. 1985); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 4010 (McKinney
1975 & Supp. 1981); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.27 (Page 1981); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19-

34 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED
(1980); WASH. REV. CODE

LAWS ANN. § 21-3-12
ANN. § 7.70.080 (Supp.

(1979);
1986).

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 29-26-119

87. See supra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
88. The legislature expressed its goals in an amendment to the preamble to the Medical
Injury Compensation Reform Act ("MICRA"), CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 125.5 (West
Supp. 1986):
The legislature finds and declares that there is a major health care crisis in the
State of California attributable to skyrocketing malpractice premium costs and resulting in a potential breakdown of the health care delivery system, severe hardships
for the medically indigent, a denial of access for the economically marginal and depletion of physicians such as to substantially worsen the quality of health care available to citizens of this state. The legislature, acting within the scope of its police
powers, finds the statutory remedy herein provided is intended to provide an ade-
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the public policy favoring lower medical malpractice insurance outweighed the public policies favoring the less culpable party and encouraging the purchase of insurance.
Workers' Compensation Exception when Employer is a Concurrent Tortfeasor
The California Supreme Court in Witt v. Jackson89 also established
a narrow exception to the collateral source rule in cases in which the
plaintiff's employer provides collateral benefits in the form of workers'
compensation and is a concurrent tortfeasor with a third party. 90 The
employer's statutory right to subrogation against third-party
tortfeasors 9t is defeated to the extent that his payments of workers' compensation benefits falls short of his share of responsibility for the employee's total recovery. 92 To the extent that the employer is precluded
from reimbursement, the third-party tortfeasor may reduce the judgment
by the amount of the collateral benefits paid by the employer. 93 Thus,
the plaintiff is precluded from a double recovery.
The rule of negligence permitting only one recovery from concurrent tortfeasors provides the basis for this exception. 94 The workers'
quate and reasonable remedy within the limits of what the foregoing public health
and safety considerations permit now and into the foreseeable future.
1975 Cal. Stat. 2d Executive Sess., ch. 2, § 12.5(b).
The Alabama legislature used the same policy rationale of controlling insurance costs to
eliminate the Rule in products liability actions. ALA. CODE § 6-5-520-25 (Supp. 1984). On
similar grounds, a bill has been introduced in Congress that would abolish the Rule with
respect to the receipt of workers' compensation benefits in products liability actions. S. 44,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 11 (1983); see supra note 71. Colorado abolished the Rule as part of its
automobile no-fault insurance scheme. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 10-4-713 (1973 & Supp. 1985).
89. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961).
90. Id. at 69, 366 P.2d at 648, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
91. Under California's workers' compensation system, the employer has a right of subrogation against a third-party tortfeasor, which allows the employer to recoup from the
tortfeasor the amount of workers' compensation benefits paid to the injured employee. CAL.
LAB. CODE §§ 3852, 3853, 3856(b) (West 1971 & Supp. 1986).
92. Associated Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d
829, 842, 587 P.2d 684, 691-92, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 895-96 (1978). "[T]o allow the negligent
employer reimbursement would permit him to profit from his own wrong contrary to the mandate of Civil Code section 3517... ." Id. at 834, 587 P.2d at 686, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 890. The
California Civil Code provides that "[n]o one can take advantage of his own wrong." CAL.
CIV. CODE § 3517 (West. 1970); see also Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1961) (applying the above principle to contributory negligence).
93. Associated Constr. & Eng'r Co. v. Workers' Compensation Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 829, 842,
587 P.2d 684, 691-92, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 895-96 (1978).
94. The California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue or
not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to one or
more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same tort(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its terms
so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the amount stipulated
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compensation benefits recovered are considered partial satisfaction by a
joint tortfeasor and, thus, the liability of the other tortfeasor must be
reduced pro tanto.95
Double Liability Exception

When application of the collateral source rule would expose the defendant tortfeasor to double liability, California courts have held that the
Rule is inapplicable. 96 The courts have reasoned that the well-recognized interest in protecting a defendant from double liability outweighs
traditional judicial adherence to the Rule, mandating an exception to the
Rule's application in cases in which double liability is possible.97
In sum, application of the Rule in a particular case ultimately depends upon whether the injured party "actually or constructively" contributed to the source of the benefits98 and whether another applicable
public policy weighs against applying the Rule. 99 Courts have established exceptions to the Rule when there is an important, contravening
public policy. 100 Exceptions are most often made in cases in which insurance premiums have risen dramatically, or when another conflicting,
well-founded rule of tort law is applicable to the fact situation presented.
Both the source of the benefits and the relevant public policies must be
considered when determining the applicability of the Rule to a given fact
situation.

California's Uninsured Motorist Statute
The California legislature first enacted an uninsured motorist coverby the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration
paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for any
contribution to any other tortfeasors.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 885
(1979).
95. DeCruz v. Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 225-26, 444 P.2d 342, 347-48, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550,
555-56 (1968).
96. See Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 11 n.15, 465 P.2d 61,
67 n.15, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 179 n.15 (1970); Ferraro v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 102 Cal. App.
3d 33, 162 Cal. Rptr. 238 (1980); Conely v. Foster, 335 S.W.2d 904 (Ky. Ct. App. 1960); Cox
v. Turner, 207 S.E.2d 152 (W. Va. 1974). See generally Annot., 77 A.L.R.3D 366, 384 (1977).
But not all courts have reached the same conclusion. In United States v. Merrigan, 389 F.2d
21 (3d Cir. 1968), the court said that the defendant's fear of double liability was unfounded
because he could take steps to avoid it. Id. at 26. The court did not explain, however, what
those steps were.
97. Ferraro v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 3d 33, 46, 162 Cal. Rptr. 238, 246
(1980).
98. See supra notes 81-82 & accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 83-97 & accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 83-97 & accompanying text.
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age statute in 1959.101 Although the statute subsequently has undergone
some minor changes, 10 2 its purpose has remained the same: protection10 of
3
the insured motorist from injuries caused by an uninsured motorist.
California's uninsured motorist statute, insurance code section
11580.2,104 requires that every automobile insurance contract must contain a provision providing coverage for the insured against injury by an
uninsured motorist. 0 5 The insured contributes directly to this fund
through his automobile insurance premiums. The amount of coverage is
specified by statute 0 6 and can be reduced or eliminated only by written
agreement in a form specified by the statute. 10 7 Section 11580.2 also
grants the insurer subrogation rights for the amount of benefits paid to its
101. The original statute remained in force for only two years. P. EISLER & J.
MOLINELLI, supra note 17, § 1.6. In 1961 the legislature repealed the 1959 statute and enacted
the current version of the uninsured motorist benefits statute. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2
(West Supp. 1986).
102. For a complete legislative history, see P. EISLER & J. MOLINELLI, supra note 17,

§ 1.7.
103. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 771, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881, 888 (1980).
104. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2 (West Supp. 1986).
105. Id. § 11580.2(a). This subdivision provides in part:
(a)(1) No policy of bodily injury liability insurance covering liability arising out of
the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle ... shall be issued or delivered in this state to the owner or operator of a motor vehicle, or shall be issued or
delivered by any insurer licensed in this state upon any motor vehicle then principally used or principally garaged in this state, unless the policy contains, or has added to it by endorsement, a provision with coverage limits at least equal to the limits
specified in subdivision (m) and in no case less than the financial responsibility requirements specified in Section 16056 of the Vehicle Code insuring the insured, the
insured's heirs or legal representatives for all sums which he, she, or they shall be
legally entitled to recover as damages for bodily injury or wrongful death from the
owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. The insurer and any named insured... may, by agreement in writing, in the form specified in paragraph (2), delete
the provision covering damage caused by an uninsured motor vehicle (1) completely,
or (2) delete such coverage when a motor vehicle is operated by a natural person or
persons designated by name, or agree to provide such coverage in an amount less
than that required by subdivision (m) but not less than the financial responsibility
requirements specified in section 16056 of the Vehicle Code.
Id.
106. California Insurance Code § 11580.2(m) provides:
Coverage provided under an uninsured motorist endorsement or coverage shall
be offered with coverage limits equal to the limits of liability for bodily injury in the
underlying policy of insurance, but shall not be required to be offered with limits in
excess of the following amounts:
(1) A limit of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000) because of bodily injury to or
death of one person in any one accident.
(2) Subject to the limit for one person set forth in paragraph (1), a limit of sixty
thousand dollars ($60,000) because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident.
Id. § 11580.2(m).
107. Id. § 11580.2(a)(1)-(2).
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insured under the uninsured motorist coverage. 108
While this subrogation clause represents a departure from the common-law rule that personal injury claims are neither assignable nor
subject to subrogation, 10 9 it serves two important functions. First, subrogation rights prevent the plaintiff from receiving a double recovery for his
injuries because the insurer has a right to the proceeds of any judgment
against a third-party tortfeasor. 110 Second, allowing the insurer to
recoup the benefits paid to its insured lowers overall insurance costs,
which results in lower premiums.I'
As a result of the inclusion of the subrogation clause, the two primary criticisms of the collateral source rule are inapposite when applied
to the receipt of benefits under the California uninsured motorist statute.
Because the possibility of double recovery is eliminated, the Rule does
not contradict the compensatory function of tort law." 12 In addition, because the plaintiff's insurer can recoup the collateral benefits
paid, appliI3
cation of the Rule would not increase insurance costs."
108.

Id. § 11580.2(g). This section states:
The insurer paying a claim under an uninsured motorist endorsement or coverage shall be entitled to be subrogated to the rights of the insured to whom such claim
was paid against any person legally liable for such injury or death to the extent that
payment was made. Such action may be brought within three years from the date
that payment was made hereunder.

Id.
Under the right of subrogation, one party is substituted in the place of another as the
possessor of any rightful claim possessed by the first party. 58 CAL. JUR. 3D Subrogation § 1
(1980). Under California Insurance Code § 11580.2(g), the insurer is subrogated automatically to the rights of the insured upon the payment of insurance benefits. CAL. INS. CODE
§ 11580.2(g) (West Supp. 1986). This allows the insurer to prosecute an action against a thirdparty tortfeasor in its own name for the amount of benefits paid to the insured. Johnson v.
Oliver, 266 Cal. App. 2d 178, 181-82, 72 Cal. Rptr. 137, 140 (1968). Alternatively, the insurer
may join with the insured in an action against the third-party tortfeasor. 4 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE § 113 (3d ed. 1985). The majority of jurisdictions also hold that, upon
timely motion, the defendant tortfeasor can compel the joinder of either the missing insurer or
insured. 3A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 17.09 [2-1] (2d ed. 1985).
Because the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured, however, it has only those rights
to which the insured was entitled. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1795 (1982). Accordingly, a
prior act by the subrogor/insured can destroy the subrogee/insurer's right of action. Id.
§ 1810.
109. Comment, supra note 16, at 526.
110. See P. EISLER & J. MOLINELLI, supra note 17, § 10.2. According to Eisler, the provision was designed for this purpose only. Id.
111. The legislature considered the increased insurance costs resulting from mandatory
uninsured motorist coverage. TRAFFIC ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES SUBCOMM. OF THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FINAL REPORT TO THE CAL. LEGIS. at 15, reprintedin 3 APPENDIX TO THE JOURNAL OF THE ASSEMBLY

(1959).

112. See supra notes 28-31 & accompanying text (discussion of the criticism of the Rule as
contradictory to the compensatory function of tort law).
113. See supra note 39 & accompanying text (discussion of the criticism of the Rule as
leading to increased insurance costs).
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Applicability of the Collateral Source Rule to California
Uninsured Motorist Benefits
Two California appellate decisions have discussed the applicability
of the collateral source rule to uninsured motorist benefits.1 14 Although
the two cases are factually similar, the courts reached different conclusions on the issue of whether the Rule should be applied.
In Waite v. Godfrey,1 15 plaintiff sustained personal injuries and damage to her automobile as a result of an automobile accident caused by
three negligent motorists. 116 One of the motorists was considered an uninsured motorist because he fled the scene.1 17 Plaintiff filed suit against
the remaining defendants and8 received a $12,000 settlement from her un11
insured motorist coverage.
At the close of trial, the jury awarded plaintiff $20,000.119 The trial
judge, however, applied the Rule and denied the defendants' motion to
1 20
set off the judgment by the amount of collateral benefits received.
The court of appeal reversed and allowed the setoff. 12 1 Applying the
California Supreme Court's analysis of the Rule in Helfend v. Southern
1 22 the court reasoned
CaliforniaRapid TransitDistrict,
that the Rule was
not applicable because payment of the collateral benefits did not allow
defendants to benefit from their own wrong, but rather from the wrong of
a third party, who was an uninsured motorist.1 23 Furthermore, because
the collateral benefits were paid on behalf of a third-party motorist, pay124
ment of the benefits was similar to a payment from a joint tortfeasor.
Thus, the court found that California Code of Civil Procedure section
114. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1985); Waite v.
Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980).
115. 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980).
116. Id. at 763, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
117. Id. A hit and run driver qualifies as an uninsured motorist under California Insurance Code § 11580.2(b) provided that four conditions are met:
(1) The owner or operator of the motor vehicle is unknown.
(2) There is physical contact of such automobile with: (a) the insured, or (b) an
automobile which the insured is occupying;
(3) The accident is reported to a designated peace officer within 24 hours;
(4) A sworn statement is filed with the insurer within 30 days thereafter.
CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (West Supp. 1986); see P. EISLER & J. MOLINELLI, supra note
17, § 4.8 (summarizing California case law).
118. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 764, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
119. Id. at 765, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 775, 163 Cal. Rptr at 891.
122. Id. at 772-73, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 888-89 (citing Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit
Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 465 P.2d 61, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173 (1970), discussed supra notes 48-57 & accompanying text).
123. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 772-73, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 888-89.
124. Id.
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877125 governed,
which permits only one payment from joint
26
tortfeasors. 1
Because the collateral benefits were paid as a result of injury caused
by a joint tortfeasor not joined as a party, the conduct of defendants
before the court, who were insured, had no relationship whatsoever to
the settlement received by the plaintiff. 127 In other words, the conduct of
the defendants before the court did not cause the payment of uninsured
motorist benefits. Thus, there was no windfall to defendants that would
reward them for their own wrongdoing. Therefore, the punitive aspect of
the Rule, that of providing the plaintiff a windfall at the expense of the
culpable defendant, 128 is inapplicable. Absent such a setoff, there would
be an excess recovery to the plaintiff.129 Furthermore, the Waite court
noted that the Rule previously had been applied only to special damages
and not general damages, such as those that uninsured motorist benefits
are intended to cover. 130 Finally, the court reasoned that, by not allowing a setoff of the collateral uninsured motorist benefits, the defendants would be subjected to the possibility of double liability due to the
insurer's right of subrogation against defendants.13 1
Reaching a conclusion contrary to that in Waite, another California
appellate court discussed the applicability of the Rule to the uninsured
motorist benefits in Van Dyne v. McCarty.132 In Van Dyne, plaintiff was
1 33
injured in an automobile accident caused by three negligent motorists.
One of the motorists was unidentified and, therefore, classified as an un125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980).
126. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 772-73, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 888-89; see supra note 122. The
court analogized this exception to the Rule to the one presented in Witt v. Jackson, 57 Cal. 2d
57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961). In Associated Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Workers'
Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d 829, 587 P.2d 684, 150 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1978), the court
modified the Witt exception to conform with comparative negligence. In Witt, the California
Supreme Court held that workers' compensation benefits, when the employer was joined as a
joint tortfeasor, should be deducted from the judgment. Witt, 57 Cal. 2d at 73, 366 P.2d at
650, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
:127. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
.128. See supra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
129. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 772-73, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 889.
130. Id. at 773-74, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 889-90. Special damages cover actual pecuniary loss,
for example, medical expenses or loss of earning capacity. General damages are damages that
"generally" flow from the kind of wrong done by the defendant. D. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES §3.2 (1973). This distinction appears to be irrelevant. The Rule has not been applied to
cover general damages mainly because collateral sources do not pay the injured party for general damages, but only for special damages. The failure to apply the Rule when the collateral
benefits include general damages, therefore, is not supported by any underlying policy
rationale.
131. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 774-75, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 890-91.
132. 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1985).
133. Id. at 819, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 572. Defendants Dunn, McDonald, the owner of the car
driven by McCarty, and the unidentified driver were considered uninsured. Defendant McCarty, driver of McDonald's car, was insured. Id. at 820, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
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insured motorist.13 4 Plaintiff received $15,000 in collateral benefits from
her uninsured motorist coverage because two of the defendants were also
135
uninsured.
The jury returned a $47,500 verdict against the two remaining defendants. 136 Relying on Waite, the trial court granted defendants' motion to reduce the judgment
by the amount of the collateral uninsured
13 7
motorist benefits received.
The court of appeal reversed. 38 The court distinguished Waite as
factually inapposite on the grounds that the collateral benefits were paid
in the present case because the defendants were uninsured, not because
an unknown third party was uninsured.13 9 Accordingly, the uninsured
motorist benefits were paid as a result of the defendants' wrongdoings,
not those of a third party. The Van Dyne court further explained that
application of the Rule would not subject defendants to double liability
because, at the time of the appeal, the three-year statute of limitations on
the insurer's subrogation claim already had run. 4°
Finally, the court stated that Waite had failed to consider plaintiff's
liability to her insurer for reimbursement of the benefits paid if the
amount of such benefits also were recovered from a tortfeasor. 4 1 Therefore, if the insurer chose to seek reimbursement, the plaintiff would have
a net recovery of $32,500 from the tortfeasor.' 42 This recovery, plus the
$15,000 originally received from the insurer, would result in a total recovery for plaintiff of $47,500, the exact amount that the jury found
would compensate the plaintiff for the injuries caused by the defendants.
Reimbursement of the insurer, therefore, would avoid a double recovery.
Waite and Van Dyne fail to provide a workable standard for applying the Rule to uninsured motorist benefits. Each case erroneously relies
primarily upon the artificial distinction of whether the uninsured party is
before the court to determine the applicability of the Rule. In doing so,
each court failed to account for the Rule's public policy rationale of encouraging the purchase of insurance by individuals 4 3 and placed undue
emphasis on the punitive aspect of the Rule by considering only whether
134. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(b) (West Supp. 1986); see supra note 117.
135. Van Dyne, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
136. Id. at 819, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
137. Id. at 819-20, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 573.
138. Id. at 822-23, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75.
139. Id. at 821, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
140. Id. at 821-22, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
141. Id. at 822, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75. Under the terms of the plaintiff's policy, after
payment of benefits for her injuries, the insurer was "entitled to the extent of such payment to
the proceeds of any settlement or judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily
injury because of which such payment was made .... " Id. at 822, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
142. Id. at 822, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574-75.
143. See supra notes 48-57 & accompanying text.
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the defendants could be considered culpable. 144Additionally, each court
failed to understand how the principle of subrogation operates in conjunction with the Rule. 14 5 The next section of the Note further analyzes
these cases and demonstrates that the Rule should be applied uniformly
to uninsured motorist benefits.
An Alternative Analysis of California's Collateral Source
Rule as Applied to the Receipt of Uninsured
Motorist Benefits
Determining whether the collateral source rule should be applied to
a particular fact situation requires a balancing of factors: the extent to
which the injured party "actually or constructively" contributes to the
benefit fund 14 6 must be weighed against possible countervailing public
policies. 147 A consideration of these factors in the context of uninsured
motorist benefits indicates that the Rule should be applied uniformly to
the receipt of uninsured motorist benefits by injured motorists, except in
cases in which an insurer has exercised his statutory subrogation right
before or at the same time plaintiff files suit. This proposed rule is consistent with the rationales favoring application of the Rule and, contrary to
the California appellate courts' rulings,1 4 8 there is no countervailing public policy.
The Rationales Underlying Application of the Rule to the Receipt of
Uninsured Motorist Benefits
The source of the collateral benefits and the rationales underlying
application of the collateral source rule support its application to the receipt of uninsured motorist benefits. First, with respect to uninsured motorist benefits, plaintiff is the source of the collateral benefits: plaintiff
has paid directly into the fund providing the benefits in the form of insurance premiums for uninsured motorist coverage. The justification for application of the Rule is most compelling in this situation. 149 In addition,
application of the Rule to the receipt of uninsured motorist benefits is
consistent with the public policy encouraging the purchase of insurance
for protection against accidents. 150 If a defendant were allowed to reduce
the judgment against him by the amount of collateral benefits paid, the
plaintiff would suffer a net loss because plaintiff's insurance premiums
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
84 Cal.

See supra notes 28-31 & accompanying text.
See supra notes 108-13 & accompanying text.
See supra note 98 & accompanying text.
See supra notes 99-100 & accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-45 & accompanying text.
See supra note 57 & accompanying text.
Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 9-10, 465 P.2d 61, 66-67,
Rptr. 173, 178-79 (1970).
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would provide him with no benefit.15 1
Application of the Rule to uninsured motorist benefits also serves
the public policy favoring the innocent party over the tortfeasor. 152 Reducing the plaintiff's judgment by the amount of collateral benefits received would result in a windfall to the tortfeasor because he would not
be required to pay for all the damage he has caused. Although application of the Rule may result in a windfall to the plaintiff, public policy
favors this result because the plaintiff is the innocent party.
Finally, application of the Rule to uninsured motorist benefits
would not necessarily result in over-compensation for the plaintiff, which
is one of the main criticisms of the Rule. 153 Under California Insurance
Code section 11580.2(g), 154 the insurer's statutory right to subrogation,
allowing reimbursement from the plaintiff for the amount of benefits
paid,1 55 avoids a double recovery. Consequently, operation of the Rule
in this instance does not frustrate the compensatory function of tort
law. 156 Application of the Rule simply would shift the burden of the loss
from the insurer to the tortfeasor.1 57 If, however, the insurer waives his
right of subrogation or simply fails to exercise it, the plaintiff will receive
a double recovery. Nevertheless, the public policy against permitting a
double recovery would be outweighed in the context of uninsured motorist benefits by the competing public policies mentioned above that support application of the Rule: encouraging the purchase of insurance and
favoring the innocent party over the tortfeasor.1 58
In sum, application of the Rule to the receipt of uninsured motorist
benefits is consistent with the Rule's underlying public policy rationales.
In addition, application of the Rule in this context may not result in a
double recovery for the plaintiff because of the operation of the statutory
subrogation right.
Application of the Rule in the fact situations presented in Waite 159
and Van Dyne1 60 also is consistent with the Rule's underlying rationales.
The Waite court reasoned that, because the payment of the uninsured
151. See id.
152. See supra notes 41-42 & accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 28-29 & accompanying text.
154. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West Supp. 1986) (granting the insurer a statutory
right of subrogation); see supra notes 108-13 & accompanying text.
155. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 822, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571, 574-75 (1985).
156. See supra notes 28-29 & accompanying text. Of course, if the tortfeasor were insolvent, there would be no double recovery problem in the first place because the only recovery
would be from the insurer.
157. Fleming, supra note 2, at 1498-99.
158. See supra notes 41-43 & accompanying text.
159. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980); see supra notes
115-31 & accompanying text.
160. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1985); see supra
notes 132-42 & accompanying text.
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motorist benefits did not depend on the culpability of the defendants, the
defendants would not "garner the benefits of [their] victim's providence."' 16 1 The court stated that these benefits were in "no conceivable
sense traceable to any act of the defendants."' 162 The court also placed
undue emphasis on the punitive nature of the Rule. Contrary to the
Waite court's reasoning, the defendants in Waite did benefit from the
plaintiff's "thrift and providence." If the plaintiff had not been insured,
the defendants unquestionably would have had to pay the full judgment
amount regardless of whether the third driver was insured. 163 Thus, the
setoff in fact did result in a windfall to defendants. Because a windfall
would have accrued to either plaintiff or defendant, the Waite court
should have adhered to the policy favoring the injured party over the
tortfeasor and applied the Rule.
In addition, the Waite court ignored the California Supreme
Court's statement that when the injured party receives benefits from his
own insurance policy, the punitive nature of the Rule is not controlling. '64 The main justification of the Rule in the personal insurance context is the public policy of encouraging persons to purchase insurance. 165
Allowing a defendant to reduce his liability by the amount of the collateral insurance benefits frustrates this policy because it does not allow the
purchaser of insurance to reap the benefits of his foresight. Thus, the
Waite court's emphasis on the punitive aspects of the Rule is misplaced
as well as outweighed by the policy of encouraging individuals to
purchase insurance.
The court in Van Dyne reasoned that application of the Rule in that
case was supported by the underlying rationale of favoring the innocent
party over the tortfeasor.166 The court, however, erroneously relied upon
the fact that the uninsured drivers were before the court. 167 As stated
above, the punitive aspect of the Rule does not depend on whether the
uninsured driver is before the court; it is equally applicable if the uninsured driver is not before the court.1 68 Additionally, the Van Dyne court
failed to take into account the additional public policy rationale applica161. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 888 (quoting Helfend v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 465 P.2d 61, 66, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 178 (1970)).
162. Waite, 106 Cal. App. 3d at 772, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 888 (quoting Helfend v. Southern
Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 10, 465 P.2d 61, 66, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 178 (1970)).
163. In that case, the defendants in Waite would have had a comparative equitable indemnity claim against the third driver. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 578, 606-07, 578 P.2d 899, 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 200 (1978).
164. Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 9, 465 P.2d 61, 65-66, 84
Cal. Rptr. 173, 177-78 (1970); see supra notes 48-55 & accompanying text.
165. Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 9-10, 465 P.2d 61, 66-67,
84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 178-79 (1970).
166. Van Dyne, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574.
167. Id. at 820-21, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74.
168. See supra notes 159-63 & accompanying text.
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ble to uninsured motorist benefits of encouraging the purchase of
insurance. 169 In short, application of the Rule to Van Dyne also was
supported by both underlying rationales.
The Recognized Exceptions to Application of the Collateral Source Rule
As discussed above, courts and legislatures have adopted three principal exceptions to the collateral source rule. 170 Contrary to the courts'
views in Waite1 7 1 and Van Dyne, 172 however, the rationales for these exceptions do not apply to uninsured motorist benefits. Application of the
Rule to the receipt of uninsured motorist benefits does not lead to
increased insurance costs, which is the rationale underlying the medical
malpractice exception,1 73 does not involve a payment from a joint
tortfeasor as in the case of workers' compensation payments when an
employee is a concurrent tortfeasor with a third party, 174 and does not
subject the defendant to double liability.' 75
The High Cost of Insurance
Insurance costs would not be increased by application of the collateral source rule in the usual uninsured motorist case. The insurance industry only would pay as the collateral source of the plaintiff. The
insurance industry would not pay any subsequent judgment against the
defendant because the defendant is uninsured. The defendant himself
would have to satisfy the judgment. Thus, application of the Rule requires the insurance industry to pay only once, as the plaintiff's collateral source, and not twice, as is the case with many applications of the
Rule.
Additionally, insurance code section 11580.2(g) 176 gives the plaintiff's insurer a right of subrogation against any tort recovery. This in
turn results in a net decrease in insurance costs. Indeed, the viability of
1 77
the right of subrogation requires the strictest application of the Rule.
If the tortfeasor's liability is reduced by the amount of collateral benefits,
169. See supra notes 150-51 & accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 83-100 & accompanying text.
171. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980); see supra notes
115-31 & accompanying text.
172. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1985); see supra
notes 132-42 & accompanying text
173. See infra notes 176-80 & accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 184-91 & accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 196-208 & accompanying text.
176. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West Supp. 1986).
177. Tait, supra note 2, at 116; see infra notes 205-08 & accompanying text. Subrogation
allows the insurer who has indemnified a plaintiff to recoup the amount of indemnity from the
defendant who caused the loss. Without the Rule, a judgment against the defendant would
reflect only damages not previously indemnified, leaving the insurer nothing to claim by subrogation. In order for the subrogation principle to work, the Rule must be applied.

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

the plaintiff as a result has no further cause of action for the amount of
the collateral benefits. Consequently, because the insurer's rights are dependent upon those of the insured, the insurer will have no right to
recoup the collateral benefits, and the purpose of the subrogation clause
would be circumvented. 17 8 Therefore, application of the Rule in this
context is necessary for the exercise of subrogation rights, which in turn
decreases insurance costs.
Application of the Rule in situations similar to that in Waite and
Van Dyne also would not lead to increased insurance costs. All of the
defendants before the court in Waite were insured, and the uninsured
driver was not before the court. 179 The defendant's insurer in Waite
would bear the burden of the Rule rather than the tortfeasor himself.
This burden, however, has merely shifted from the plaintiff's insurance
company to the defendant's insurance company because of the right of
subrogation, which results in no net increase in insurance costs to society
because the plaintiff's insurer can seek reimbursement for the plaintiff. 180
In Van Dyne, two of the three defendants were uninsured. 181 With respect to the two uninsured defendants, they, not an insurance company,
would have to pay the judgment. Thus, as stated above, the Rule only
requires the insurance industry to pay once, as the plaintiff's collateral
source. 18 2 In the case of the one insured defendant, as was the case in
Waite, the burden would merely shift to the defendant's insurer, which
would result in no net higher insurance costs. 183
In summary, application of the Rule to uninsured motorist benefits
would not result in higher costs to the insurance industry. Therefore, the
first recognized rationale for an exception to the Rule, prevention of escalating insurance costs, is inapplicable in the context of uninsured motorist benefits.
Workers' Compensation Exception When Employer is Concurrent Tortfeasor

The workers' compensation exception to the collateral source rule is
applicable only when the employer is a concurrent tortfeasor with a third
party. 184 This exception is inapplicable in the context of uninsured motorist benefits because the source of those benefits necessarily is not a
concurrent tortfeasor with a third party. 185 In Witt v. Jackson,186 the
178. Tait, supra note 2, at 116.
179. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 771-72, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881, 888 (1980).
180. The plaintiff's insurer's subrogation rights would merely work against the defendant's insurer rather than against the defendant personally.
181. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 820, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571, 573 (1985).
182. See supra notes 175-78 & accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 179-80 & accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 89-95 & accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 89-95 & accompanying text.
186. 57 Cal. 2d 57, 366 P.2d 641, 17 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1961); see supra notes 89-95 & accom-
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California Supreme Court case establishing this exception, the collateral
source benefits were paid by a joint tortfeasor. 18 7 The employer paid the
workers' compensation benefits through its own insurance and then was
joined as a concurrently negligent tortfeasor. Because the source of the
collateral benefits was a concurrently negligent joint tortfeasor, civil procedure code section 877 applied and required apro tanto reduction of the
other joint tortfeasor's liability. 188
In the context of uninsured motorist benefits, the source of the collateral benefits, the plaintiff cannot be a joint tortfeasor. The Witt exception only applies when the defendant contributes to the fund providing
the benefits.1 89 Thus, the rationale for the exception recognized in Witt is
not applicable to these benefits.
The Waite 190 court established an exception to the Rule based upon
an incorrect application of the Witt exception. 19 1 In Waite, the collateral
source benefits were not provided by a joint tortfeasor as they were in
Witt. Rather, the benefits in Waite were provided by plaintiff's own insurance, precipitated by the negligence of an unknown tortfeasor; plaintiff had contributed directly to the fund from which the collateral benefits
were paid. Thus, the Waite court's reliance on the reasoning in Witt was
misplaced and led to an unsound conclusion.
In contrast to Waite, the court in Van Dyne, 192 faced with a similar
fact pattern, correctly concluded that the Witt exception was not applicable. 193 The Van Dyne court, however, erroneously based its decision
on the fact that the uninsured motorist was before the court. 194 This
distinction is irrelevant in determining whether the Witt exception applies because the plaintiff, not a tortfeasor, was the source of the collateral benefits. 195
panying text. The California Supreme Court modified Witt to conform with comparative negligence in Associated Constr. & Eng'g Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal. 3d
829, 846-47, 587 P.2d 684, 695, 150 Cal. Rptr. 888, 899 (1978).
187. Witt, 57 Cal. 2d at 68-69, 366 P.2d at 647, 17 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
188. DeCruz v. Reid, 69 Cal. 2d 217, 225-26, 444 P.2d 342, 348, 70 Cal. Rptr. 550, 556
(1960) (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1971)).
189. See supra notes 89-95 & accompanying text.
190. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980); see supra notes
115-31 & accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 89-95 & accompanying text.
192. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 817, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1985); see supra
notes 132-42 & accompanying text.
193. Van Dyne, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 820-21, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 573-74.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 190-91 & accompanying text.
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The Double Liability Exception
Contrary to the appellate courts' views in both Waite 19 6 and Van
Dyne, 197 application of the collateral source rule to uninsured motorist
benefits does not subject the defendant to double liability, except in cases
in which the insurer previously has recovered against the defendant. The
Waite and Van Dyne courts concluded that, after the tortfeasor had satisfied the plaintiff's judgment for the total amount of damages, the insured
could invoke its statutory subrogation rights and sue the tortfeasor for
the amount of benefits paid, thereby subjecting the tortfeasor to double
liability. 98 The courts in Waite and Van Dyne, however, failed to fully
consider the effect of subrogation rights on the Rule.
Upon payment of an uninsured motorist claim, the plaintiff's insurer is subrogated pro tanto for the amount of benefits paid to any right
of action the insured may have against any person causing such injury. 199
The subrogee's rights are only those rights possessed by the subrogor. 20 0
Thus, with respect to insurance payments, the insurer has only those
rights of action possessed by the insured.
The principle of subrogation allows the insurance company to bring
an action as the real party in interest for the payments made. 20 1 Accordingly, it is not improper to split a cause of action when, as a result of
partial subrogation, the insurance company and the insured bring
separate actions against the tortfeasor. 20 2 In the alternative, subrogation
allows the insured and insurer to join in one action against the
tortfeasor. 20 3 Most jurisdictions also hold that, upon a timely motion,
the defendant may join both the insured and the insurer in a single
196. Waite v. Godfrey, 106 Cal. App. 3d 760, 163 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1980); see supra notes
115-31 & accompanying text.

197. Van Dyne v. McCarty, 166 Cal. App. 3d 871, 212 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1985); see supra
notes 132-42 & accompanying text.
198. Van Dyne, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 821-22, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574; Waite, 106 Cal. App.
3d at 774-75, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 890. The court in Van Dyne concluded that the defendant was
not subject to double liability because the three-year statute of limitations had run. Van Dyne,
166 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 574. Implicit in the court's holding is the assumption that the insured would have such a right if the three-year statute of limitations had not

run. The defendant thus would be subject to double liability.
199. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West Supp. 1986); see also 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance
§ 1794, at 782-83 (1982) ("Generally, upon payment of a loss, the insurer ... is entitled to be
subrogated pro tanto to any right of action which the insured may have against a third person

whose negligence or wrongful act caused the loss." (footnote omitted)).
200. 44 AM. JUR. 2D Insurance § 1795 (1982).
201. Johnson v. Oliver, 266 Cal. App. 2d 178, 181-82, 72 Cal. Rptr. 137, 140 (1968). The
insurance company is a real party in interest. 4 B. WITKIN, supra note 108, § 112.
202. Phillips v. Western P.R.R., 22 Cal. App. 3d 441, 445, 99 Cal. Rptr. 451, 453-54
(1971); Nausmann v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 213 Cal. App. 2d 611, 613, 29 Cal. Rptr. 75, 77
(1963); Automobile Ins. Co. v. Union Oil Co., 85 Cal. App. 2d 302, 305, 193 P.2d 48, 50
(1940).
203. Phillips v. Western P.R.R., 22 Cal. App. 3d 441, 445, 99 Cal. Rptr. 451, 454 (1971).
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2 o4

action.
Because the insurer's rights depend on those of the insured, the insured may defeat the insurer's rights before the latter brings an action. 20 5
When the insured alone sues and recovers the full judgment, application
of the Rule defeats the insurer/subrogee's right of action against the
tortfeasor. 20 6 Because the subrogor cannot recover twice on the same
cause of action, the right of the subrogee against the tortfeasor is defeated
once the subrogor fully recovers. If the tortfeasor pays the insured, the
insurer can no longer look to the tortfeasor, but must seek reimbursement from the subrogor himself.20 7 Thus, there is no possibility that a
defendant will be subject to double liability when the Rule is applied to a
208
situation in which the insured sues the tortfeasor first.
When the insurer seeks to exercise its right of subrogation against
the defendant before the insured has brought suit against the defendant,
or contemporaneously with such a suit, an exception to the Rule is required. For example, in Johnson v. Oliver,20 9 the plaintiff received $1350
from her insurance policy for personal injuries sustained from a collision
caused by the defendant. 210 Through the subrogation clause, the insurer
reached an agreement with the defendant to reimburse partially the insurer for the amount of benefits paid to the injured party. 211 The plaintiff
subsequently filed a suit against the defendant for personal injuries arising out of the collision. The court correctly held that the statutory subrogation clause2 12 did not transfer the entire cause of action to the
insurance company. 21 3 The plaintiff was entitled to bring her own action
for personal injuries against the tortfeasor. 21 4 The court, however, expressly declined to define the rights of the respective parties in any fur2 15
ther litigation arising from the accident.
If the plaintiff in the above action recovered a judgment against the
defendant, the amount of the judgment would have to be reduced by the
sum already paid to the insurer. Otherwise, the defendant would be sub204. 3A J. MOORE & J. LucAs, supra note 108, %17.09 [2-1].
205. 44 AM. Jun. 2D Insurance § 1810 (1982).
206. Fleming, supra note 2, at 1498-99; Tait, supra note 2, at 116; 44 AM. Jun. 2D Insurance § 1810 (1982).
207. Fleming, supra note 2, at 1499.
208. If the principle of subrogation is to work, the Rule must be recognized. See Tait,
supra note 2, at 116. This is so because if the tortfeasor's liability to the plaintiff is reduced by
the amount of the collateral benefits, the plaintiff will have no cause of action for that amount
to which the collateral source can be subrogated.
209. 266 Cal. App. 2d 178, 72 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1968).
210. Id. at 179, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
211. Id.
212. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(g) (West Supp. 1986).
213. Johnson, 266 Cal. App. 2d at 182, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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jected to double liability, a result that California courts will not permit.21 6 Therefore, in order to avoid double liability, the Rule should not
be applied to receipt of uninsured motorist benefits when the insurer
brings an action against the tortfeasor before or contemporaneously with
the insured.
Thus, while any countervailing public policy is eliminated by providing an exception to the uniform application of the Rule in situations
similar to that in Johnson, the possibility still exists that the plaintiff may
receive a double recovery if the insurer does not exercise its right of subrogation. This objection, however, is outweighed by the rationales underlying the Rule that support its application in the context of uninsured
motorist benefits. As noted above, with respect to uninsured motorist
benefits,
plaintiff contributed directly to the fund that provides the benefits. 2 17 The argument for application of the Rule is strongest in this context because the plaintiff is the source of the fund that provides the
collateral benefits. Application of the Rule to these collateral benefits
also is consistent with the public policies encouraging the purchase 2of
19
insurance 21 8 and favoring compensation of the less culpable party.
Thus, the public policies favoring application of the Rule outweigh the
possibility of double recovery, indicating that the Rule should be applied
uniformly, except in cases similar to Johnson.
Summary
None of the rationales underlying the traditional exceptions to the
collateral source rule are applicable with respect to uninsured motorist
benefits: application of the Rule to uninsured motorist benefits would
not increase overall insurance costs; 220 the source of the collateral benefits is not a joint tortfeasor; 221 and application of the Rule would not
result in double liability to the defendant. 222 The double liability rationale underlying an exception to the Rule, however, does mandate an exception to the Rule as applied to uninsured motorist benefits when the
insurer exercises his right of subrogation before or at the same time that
the insured brings suit. 223
216. Helfend v. Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 1, 11 n.15, 465 P.2d 61, 67
n.15, 84 Cal. Rptr. 173, 179 n.15 (1970); Ferraro v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 102 Cal. App. 3d
33, 46, 162 Cal. Rptr. 238, 246 (1980).
217. See supra notes 149-52 & accompanying text.
218. Helfend, 2 Cal. 3d at 9-10, 465 P.2d at 66-67, 84 Cal. Rptr. at 178-79.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42
220. See supra notes 176-80 & accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 184-91 & accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 196-208 & accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 209-18 & accompanying text.
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Conclusion
The collateral source rule has been the subject of much criticism by
courts and commentators. Its application to particular fact situations
has been haphazard and lacking a unifying principle. The application of
the Rule to uninsured motorist benefits is indicative of this problem.
Determination of the applicability of the Rule to a particular fact
situation requires a balancing of two factors: the extent to which the
injured party directly contributes to the fund providing the collateral
benefits should be balanced against any countervailing public policy.
Recognized countervailing public policies include the desire to prevent
the rapid increase in insurance costs and policies embodied in applicable
tort principles.
Contrary to the reasoning of California appellate courts, a balancing
of these factors with respect to uninsured motorist benefits illustrates that
application of the Rule is required, except in those instances in which the
insurer previously has recovered against the tortfeasor. This result is
consistent with the rationale favoring application of the Rule. Furthermore, countervailing public policies outweigh these underlying rationales
only when the insurer brings an action against the defendant based on his
right to subrogation before or contemporaneously with the insured.
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